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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through )'
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant, ,
VS.

GENERAL On.. COMPANY, a Utah ,.
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

CASE
NO. 11178

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain, brought to condemn certain land for highway purposes.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the first trial of this action the jucy returned a verdict of $4,147.52 as just compensation for the taking of
defendant's property. Upon defendant's motion the trial
court granted a new trial or, in the alternative, an additur
of $15,000.00
Plaintiff declined tile additur, and at the second trial
the court entered judgment upon a verdict of the jury in
the amount of $22,050.00, plus interest and costs.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

By this appeal plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of
the trial court granting defendant's request for a new trial
and directing that judgment be entered upon the verdict
of the jury returned in the first trial of this action. In
the alternative plaintiff requests a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parcel of land in question, consisting of 1.04 acres
more or less, occupied at the time of taking (March 19,
1964, the date of service of swnmons herein) the northwest comer of the intersection of 1500 South Street and

University Avenue, Provo City. The plaintiff sought to
condemn the property in question in exercise of its right
of eminent domain for the purpose of constructing an access route to interstate highway I-15 in the nature orf an
extension of South University Avenue.
At :the time of taking (March 19, 1964), SoutJh Universitly Avenue adjacent to the property was unpaved, and
the character of land use in the area was primarily agricultural (R. 147). The general location of the proposed
freeway access route, however, had been public knowledge
since at least as early as February, 1958 (R. 118). In
ru:iticipation of construction of the access route as an extension of South University Avenue, the land on both
sides of the road was rezoned September 21, 1959, from
an agricultural classification to a "special highway service
zone" (R. 150) in which the primary permitted uses are
motels, filling stations and restaurants (R. 159).
Actual development of the area for these purposes
did not begin until approximately two years after the tak·
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ing, the access route being completed and opened for use
in late fall, 1966 (R. 126).
At the first trial, four expert witnesses testified as to
the value of the subject property. Defendant's witnesses
testified to values of $25,800.00 and $24,010.00 respectively
(Transcript 91, 163). Plaintiff's witnesses both testified
to a value of $3,120.00 (Transcript 215, 23).
At the second trial defendant's witnesres testified to
values of $23,700.00 and $24,010.00 (R. 247-49, 327-29).
Plaintiff's witnesses again testified to a value of $3,120.00
(R. 384, 476).
Defendant's witnesses testified that at the time of taking the influence of tJhe proposed development on the value
of the subject property was direct and certain and accordingly based their evaluations in part on subsequent transactions in the area and on transactions on West Center
Street involving service station sites (R. 219-47, 290-327).
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that at the time of taking
the influence of the proposed development on the value
was speculative and remote (R. 480-81) and accordingly
based their estimates solely on transactions on South University occurring prior to the time of taking (R. 369-83,
448-75).
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THlE (X)IURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.

At the conclusion of the first trial, the court granted
defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that "the
verdict of the jury on the issues of just compensation was,
as a matter of law, inadequate . . . . "
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Rule 59(a) (5) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for the granting of a new trial on the ground of "excessive
and inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice."
The narrow limits within which a trial court is justiied in disregarding the verdict of a jury have been stated
as follows in Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d
276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960):
"We do not suggest that the jury is infallible nor that
the court should abdicate its undoubted supervisory
responsibility to see that justice is done by setting
aside a verdict if it plainly appears that there has
been a miscarriage of justice. But this is done with
reluctance and only when it is plainly apparent that
the jury has abused its prerogatives by refusing to
accept uncontroverted credible evidence or otherwise
ignoring or misapplying proven facts or established
law. If the courts were ready to override jury verdicts whenever they disagreed with them, the right of
trial by jury would be effectively abrogated and the
trial may as well be to the court in the first place." 10
Utah 2d 282.
At the first trial of this action (as also the second)
there was conflict in the evidence as to value between
plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses. ']}he unique function of the jury is to weigh such conflicting evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses. The jury did so and concluded, apparently, that plaintiff's witnesses were to be believed and that defendant's witnesses were not to be believed..
In granting defendant's motion for a new trial, the
court in effect substituted its judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury. The jury was
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in possession of substantial evidence to sustain its verdict

and the granting of a new trial was, in the light of this
Court's language in Lund, an a!buse of its discretion. As
the Court stated in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366
P.2d 201 (1961):
"The trial judge should not grant a new trial, merely
because in his opinion the amount of the award was
insufficient or excessive. Such action is warranted
only when to the trial judge, 'it seems clear that the
jucy has misapplied or failed to take into account
proven facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the law;
or made findings clearly against the weight of the
evidence.'" 12 Utah 2d 354.
In that case the trial court was affirmed in granting

a new trial because "the jury had clearly been mistaken or
misconceived the facts or the law on the amount of the
damage . . . . " 12 Utah 2d 353.
Compare Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller

Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964), a condemnation case, which this Court remanded for a new trial where
"the trial court clearly indicated that in his opinion the
jury verdict was less than the smallest amount which
the jury could reasonably award under the evidence
. . . .'' 15 Utah 2d 320.
Our case is distinguishable from Porcupine Reserv<>ir
in that the verdict was within the limits of the evidence

as to value. Applying the standard of that case to our
facts, it is clear the trial court erred in granting the new
trial.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
OF MARKET VALUES OF PROPERTIES AFFECI'ED
BY TIIE IMPROVEMENT IN QUESTION.
It is a well established principle of law that:

"As a general thing, under the greatly prevailing view,
the owner of land taken in eminent domain is not entitled to recover an increase or enhancement in the
value of his land due to the proposed improvement, although there is authority to the contrary." 27 Am.
Jur. 2d 79, Eminent Domain § 283 (1966).
A:s a logical corollary of this principle, it is held that

evidence of the market values of comparable properties,
which values have been increased by the proposed improvement, is inadmissible. Thus State Highway Comm'n of
South lbakota v. Lacey, 79 S.Dak. 451, 113 N.W.2d 50,
(1962) held that where selling prices of other properties
in the locality reflected an important enhancement of value
because of the building of a highway for which the condemnee's property was taken, such selling prices were inadmissible to determine the award to the condemnee.
Similarly in Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661,
157 N.E.2d 209 (1959) the sales price of other property
reflecting a substantial enhancement of value because of
the turnpike project in question was held inadmissible on
the question of the value of property taken for the project.
City of Houston v. Collins, 310 S.W. 2d 697 (Tex. 1958)
held evidence as to sales subsequent to the taking inadmissible unless the price sought to be offered after the
taking was not derived from the sale orf any property benefited by the improvement in question.
In this case the trial court admitted defendant's ev;-
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dence both (a) as to the value of the subject property as
affected by the improvement and (b) as to other property
the value of which was influenced by the improvement.
Thus defendant's witnesses, Wilbur R. Harding and
Werner Kiepe, both testified to the sale of certain property located at 900 South Street and University Avenue
(R. 234-38, 320-22). The sale took place in September
of 1965 (R. 235). Harding testified that the "motivating
factor" in the sale was the prospect of traffic flow from
the completion of the freeway (R. 235).
The same witness, Harding, testified to the value of
that part of defendant's parcel not taken, using as the
basis of his evaluation the capitalization of a lease between
defendant and Holiday Inn entered into in the summer Of
1965 (R. 238-44).
Under the authorities cited, the admission of this evidence was substantial and prejudicial error and plaintiff is
entitled to a new trial.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that the trial court erred (1) in granting
defendant's motion for a new trial and (2) in admitting
evidence of values as affected by the improvement Under
these circumstances plaintiff is entitled to either (1) judgment on the verdict returned in the first trial or (2) a new

trial.

Respectfully submitted,
S. REX LEWIS, for:
HOWARD AND LEWIS
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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